$\textbf{Pirates and Gold}$

Five pirates are trying to split up $1000$ gold pieces according to the following rules

• The $1^{st}$ pirate can propose a plan. If his proposal wins the majority's support (including himself), then it is done. Otherwise, he will be instantly killed.
• If the $1^{st}$ pirate is killed, then the $2^{nd}$ pirate will make a proposal. If his proposal wins the majority's support (a tie does not suffice, i.e. he needs at least $3$ votes), it is done. Otherwise, he will be instantly killed.
• The process continues until a proposal is agreed by a majority.

Assuming all these five pirates are intelligent (i.e. always choose the optimal strategy for himself), greedy (i.e. get as much as gold for himself) and ruthless (i.e. the more pirates dead, the better), what will be the final distribution of the gold?